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Abstract 
This working paper explores patterns of technology upgrading as a three-dimensional process 
which consists of (i) intensity of technology upgrading, (ii) structural change, and (iii) interaction 
with the global economy. The specificity of our report is that we depict patterns of technology 
upgrading by relying entirely on patent data. We derive patent indicators to capture the three 
dimensions. 
Patent indicators for intensity of technology upgrading trace technological capabilities at the 
technology frontier (transnational patents) and behind the technology frontier 
(domestic/resident direct applications to national offices). Structural change in technological 
knowledge is depicted by the share of transnational patent applications in high technology 
fields and knowledge-intensive activities and by calculating a technological diversification index. 
To capture interaction with global economy in the upgrading process indicators measure 
technological knowledge sourcing across countries and interactions between foreign and 
indigenous actors. Based on 7 patent indicators covering the three upgrading dimensions the 
comparative analysis focuses on EU27 and its subregions and on the BRICS countries.  
According to the results, in 2011 CEECs were quite homogenous in their upgrading paths. A 
typical CEE economy in 2011 is well behind EU12 in terms of frontier technology intensity, 
domestic technology intensity, share of high tech patents and technology sourcing abroad. 
Moreover, its organizational capabilities are often less advanced.  The CEE profile is much less 
coherent in terms of technology diversification/specialization and share of joint inventions. 
However, differences among CEECs are not significant. Still there are some notable national 
features. Poland, Romania and Slovenia have above average domestic technological intensity 
which reflects partly their sizes (Romania and Poland) and specific model of innovation system 
reliant on domestic R&D intensive firms (Slovenia). Latvia and Lithuania are specific in terms of 
high share of HTKI patents. 
CEE technology upgrading as depicted by patents is within the BRIC pattern (with exception of 
China which in terms of technology upgrading has de facto delinked from BRICS). In the BRIC 
context, the CEE characterize very open innovation system with a high share of coinventions and 
foreign actors exploiting local inventions. This reveals weak organizational capabilities to 
commercialize its own inventions. 
According to the results CEE grew during 1990s/2008 based on production, not technological 
capability. Their future growth will increasingly depend on building technological capabilities at 
world frontier level.  Our analysis shows that the basis for such growth exists only to a limited 
extent and that speed of upgrading towards world frontier activities is well beyond required for 
catching up. Equally, our analysis shows that solutions for improved technology upgrading will 
need to be found with their existing innovation model of small open economies integrated into 
the EU. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In this working paper we explore issues related to technology upgrading of the European Union 
(EU) peripheral economies, especially of the new EU member states1. Technology upgrading is 
the key to further long-term growth as suggested by the growth literature. This has been 
already recognised by the EU policy agenda which has promoted Smart Specialization Strategies 
(SSS) as the ex-ante conditionality for use of the EU Structural Funds to so call less favoured EU 
regions and countries. In addition, EU has been using the European Innovation Scoreboard as it 
was called in the past and now Innovation Union Scoreboard (IUS) as the major metrics in 
assessing progress of all EU countries in terms of their innovation capacity. This metrics has 
become so dominant that some of its either individual or aggregate indicators have been used 
as policy objectives and benchmarks in measuring how countries perform in achieving the aims 
of SSS and other national policy targets.  
 
Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) are largely middle-income economies but it is 
not certain whether they have achieved a threshold of technological capability required for 
catching up to high-income economies status2. The shift from middle income to high-income is 
not guaranteed or is not automatic as growth process is usually non-linear and evolves across 
several threshold levels with their specific threshold requirements.  In order to understand this 
process we need to be open to a variety of historical experiences as well as go beyond simple 
explanations of growth be they adequate institutions (REF3), human capital (Glaeser et, 2004 4) 
or Research and Development (R&D) (OECD, 20045).  
 
In order to advance research in this area we approach to the issue of growth and measurement 
of growth through the perspective of technology upgrading. This is a multidimensional 
conceptual framework which is open to sensitivities of different levels of development and 
which is also empirically informed but also has some theoretical relevance. We consider it as 
appreciative theorizing framework which aim to overcome a frequent weakness of composite 
indicators which is that they represent “measurement without theory” (Koopmans, 19476).  A 
conceptual approach is based on the literature review and is developed as part of this task in a 
paper by Radosevic and Yoruk (2014) Why do we need theory and metrics of technology 
upgrading? as part of this deliverable. Here we rely broadly on this approach but we also 
develop it further by applying it based on patent data.  
 
The paper is organised as follows: We first explain approach to technology upgrading by 
discussing its elements (section 2). In section 3 we use this approach to analyse individual 
                                                          
1
 By European periphery we mean neighboring countries, which are not members of the EU. These are West 
Balkan countries, Turkey, and European CIS countries 
2
 Based on World Bank criteria only Bulgaria and Romania are middle income economies while others are in a high 
income group. However, from our perspective this classification is not suitable for categorising CEECs and for 
understanding middle income trap. 
3
 Acemoglu Daron and James Robinson (2008) The Role of Institutions in Growth and Development, Commission 
on Growth and Development, Working Paper No. 10, The World Bank 
4
 Glaeser, Edward L; R. LaPorta F. Lopes-de-Silanes and A. Shleifer (2004). "Do Institutions Cause Growth?". Journal 
of Economic Growth. 
5
 OECD (2004) Understanding Growth, Palgrave Macmillan, London 
6
 T.C. Koopmans, Measurement without theory, Rev. Econ. Stat. 29 (3) (1947) 161–172. 
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indicators of technology upgrading. Section 4 explores position of EU in technology upgrading 
in a comparative perspective of the EU28 and BRICS economies. In section 5 we explore three 
dimensions of technology upgrading. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. DETECTING TECHNOLOGY UPGRADING THROUGH PATENT DATA: A 
CONCEPTUAL APPROACH  
 
Our departing proposition is that technology upgrading is multidimensional process. By this we 
mean that: it is based on broader understanding of innovation, which goes well beyond R&D. It 
is multi-level process which means that it is micro, mezzo and macro grounded but which also 
means that at its core is structural change in various dimensions: technological, industrial, 
organisational. It is also an outcome of global forces (embodied in international trade and 
investment flows) and local strategies (pursued by host country firms and governments)(for 
extensive review of literature on this issue see Radosevic and Yoruk, 20147; for perspective 
along these lines see Ernst, 20088;Lall, 19929).  
In nutshell, based on literature review and at general level we approach to technology 
upgrading as three-dimensional process.  It consists of dimension 1: which is about intensity of 
technology upgrading as depicted by different types and levels of innovation activities, of 
dimension 2: which is about spread or width of technology like diversity of technological 
knowledge, and of dimension 3: which depicts knowledge inflows into economy through a 
variety of forms like trade, FDI and global value chains. All three dimensions have strong 
grounding in the respective literatures on firm level technology upgrading, on structural change 
and growth, and on integration in global economy. Figure 1 summarizes three dimensions 
and paths of technology upgrading.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
77
 Slavo Radosevic and Esin Yoruk (2014) Are there global shifts in world science base? Analysis of catching up and 
falling behind of world regions, Scientometrics, June, DOI 10.1007/s11192-014-1344-1 
8
 Ernst, Dieter (2008) Asia’s “upgrading through innovation” strategies and global innovation networks: an 
extension of Sanjaya Lall’s research agenda, Transnational Corporations, Volume 17, Number 3, December 2008 
9
 Lall, S. (1992), Technological capabilities and industrialization, Research Policy, Vol. 20, No. 2, 165-186 
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Figure 1: Dimensions and paths of technology upgrading 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: authors 
 
 
In the technology upgrading process dimension 1 evolves from domestic behind technology 
frontier efforts towards world frontier technology efforts. Dimension 2 goes in direction of 
increasing diversification in terms of categories of technological knowledge and increasing 
share of knowledge in high growth or dynamic areas. Dimension 3 evolves from invention 
process being driven by foreign actors towards joint knowledge generation and then towards 
sourcing of technology from abroad. We aim at capturing these dimensions and their evolution 
using patent indicators.  
The body of research on measuring countries’ performance in growth, competitiveness and 
innovation offers a variety of composite indicators. Examples are: the Global Competitiveness 
Index (WEF, 201210), the Knowledge Economy Index (Chen and Dahlman, 200411) of the World 
Bank, the World Competitiveness Report Index of IMD (http://www.imd.org/), Technological 
capability of countries and the ArCo, (Archibugi and Coco, 200512, 200413; Archibugi et al., 
200914), the UNIDO Industrial Performance Scoreboard (UNIPS), the Summary Innovation Index 
                                                          
10
 World Economic Forum (2012) Global Competitiveness Report 2011-12, WEF, Geneva  
11
 Chen, Derek H. C.; Dahlman, Carl J.. 2004. Knowledge and Development: A Cross-Section Approach. World Bank, 
Washington, D.C 
12
 Daniele Archibugi and Alberto Coco (2005) Measuring technological capabilities at the country level: A survey 
and a menu for choice, Research Policy 34 (2005) 175–194 
13
 Daniele Archibugi and  Alberto Coco (2004)A New Indicator of Technological Capabilities for Developed and 
Developing Countries (ArCo), World Development Vol. 32, No. 4, pp. 629–654, 2004 
14 Daniele Archibugi, Denni, M. and Filippetti, A. (2009). The technological capabilities of nations: The state of the 
art of synthetic indicators. Technological Forecasting and Social Change Vol. 76: 917-931 
DIMENSION1 
Intensity of technology upgrading:  
from behind technology frontier 
to technology frontier 
 
DIMENSION 3 
Interaction with global economy  
(from inventions driven by foreign actors, to co-inventions  
and to technology sourcing from abroad)   
 
DIMENSION 2 
Breadth of technology upgrading 
(structural changes towards diversification of 
technological knowledge and increased share of high 
technology and knowledge intensive activities) 
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and the Global Innovation Index, both of the European Commission; the Technological Activity 
Index of the UNIDO; the Technological Advance Index of the UNCTAD; the Technology 
Achievement Index, developed by UNDP and reported in the Human Development Report 
2001, and the S&T Capacity Index (STCI) proposed by the RAND Corporation, the High-Tech 
Indicators (HTI) developed at the Georgia Tech Technology Policy and Assessment Center and 
reported by the National Science Foundation's Science & Engineering Indicators. 
Nasierowski and Arcelus (2000)15show that similarity in ranking across different indexes are 
significant. They all point to importance of innovation to economic development but 
differences in their conceptual perspectives do not change significantly ranking among 
countries. Archibugi  et al (2009)16 show similar results but also show that differences in ranking 
cannot be substituted by single indicator like R&D.  
 
It is important to bear in mind that different indexes treat ‘technology’ in different ways. Some 
of them cannot be taken as a direct measure of innovative performance. Indicators like Global 
Competiveness Index depict the quality of the current endowment of a country (including 
institutions) and among them also the technology activities as one of determinants of growth. 
Our aim is to confine ourselves to technology upgrading and we do not aim to unravel a 
complex picture of the entirety of factors that determine growth and competiveness of 
economies.  Also, unlike the majority of rankings, our aim is not really to focus on ranking but 
on different paths of technology upgrading. The learning effect should be in showing diversity 
of paths and compare countries in terms of their own upgrading paths.  
 
The specificity of our paper is that we depict patterns of technology upgrading by relying 
entirely on patent data. On the one hand, the exclusive reliance on patents has costs in terms 
of capturing only a part of technology effort. Their intangible character is more advantageous 
as countries move up towards technology frontier and less relevant for countries behind 
technology frontier where IPRs are not the major form of protection of technological knowhow.  
This is especially important as innovation activities in latecomer economies like CEE are largely 
about adoption and improvements on imported machinery. Although, technology as stock of 
knowledge should be kept separate from production, technological capacities and production 
capacity are in reality strictly interconnected (Bell and Pavitt, 199717). However, use of only 
patents means that similar to  Archibugi and Coco (200518) we need to abstract production 
from technology capability. On the other hand, an important advantage of using patents is the 
length and consistency of time series derived as well as the possibility to identify technological 
fields or specializations using the patent classification. Unlike macroeconomic variables 
                                                          
15
 W. Nasierowski and  F.J. Arcelus (2013) On Perceptions of Technical Efficiency of the Basis of the Innovation 
Union Scoreboard. Available online at: 
https://www.guidedbees.com/~ruben/EDSI/papers/nasierowski_onperceptions.pdf (last accessed January 2015) 
16
 Archibugi Daniele, Mario Denni, Andrea Filippetti (2009) The technological capabilities of nations: The state of 
the art of synthetic indicators Technological Forecasting & Social Change 76: 917–931 
17 
Bell, M. and Pavitt, K. (1997) Technological accumulation and industrial growth: contrasts between developed 
and developing countries, in Archibugi, D. and Michie, J. (eds) 1997a 
18 
Daniele Archibugi and Alberto Coco (2005) Measuring technological capabilities at the country level: A survey 
and a menu for choice, Research Policy 34 (2005) 175–194 
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technological capabilities are changing very slowly even during periods of deep economic crises 
or high growth periods (Archibugi, 200919).  By using patents we can detect easily stock and 
flows and thus depict much better compared to other indicators changes in technology 
intensity as well as structural change in technological knowledge. These two dimensions – 
technology upgrading and structural change – should be considered jointly with the way 
economy integrates itself in global knowledge flows.  
 
In overall, we think that benefits surpass costs in this case provided that we are aware of the 
changing nature of patenting as countries move from the position of technology followers to 
leaders and as they shift from domestic and behind frontier technology effort to world frontier 
technology effort. Figure 2 shows patent indicators used which depict individual dimensions of 
technology upgrading.   
 
Figure 2: Dimensions and components of technology upgrading as depicted by patent 
indicators 
 
Source: authors 
 
 
 
2.1. INTENSITY OF TECHNOLOGY UPGRADING (SCALE) 
 
This dimension of upgrading is about acquiring different types of technology capabilities, which 
are also a reflection of different technological levels of economies. Economies that operate 
behind technology frontier are more likely to grow based on production capability while high-
                                                          
19
 Archibugi, Daniele,  Mario Denni, Andrea Filippetti (2009) The technological capabilities of nations: The state of 
the art of synthetic indicators Technological Forecasting & Social Change 76 (2009) 917–931 
•Transnational patenting (TN) 
•Resident direct patenting (WIPO) 
Intensity of 
technology 
upgrading 
• Foreign applications of national inventions (FANI) 
•International Co-inventions (COINV) 
•National applications of foreign inventions NAFI) 
Interaction with 
global economy 
•Patent applications in high tech and knowledge intensive 
services (HTKI) 
• Technological knowledge diversification of domestic and 
transnational patent categories (Herfindhal index) 
Breadth of 
technology 
upgrading  
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income economies are more likely to grow based on technology frontier (R&D based) activities. 
Three types of capabilities (production capability, technology capability, R&D) are present in all 
economies to different degrees. Their importance as drivers of growth varies in dependence of 
achieved income and technology levels as well as of the structural features of economies. 
We use patent indicators to measure domestic technological capability. Nonetheless, for the 
analysis it is necessary to differ between domestic technological capability pushing the 
technology frontier and domestic technological capability for technological development 
behind technology frontier. To capture domestic technological activities pushing the technology 
frontier we rely on transnational patent applications of domestic applicants (TN). Transnational 
patent applications include applications to the European Patent Office and PCT applications. 
These patent filings reflect technological activities relevant for competitiveness in international 
markets. This international relevance of patent protection suggests that the technology 
protected pushes the technology frontier at a global level.  To capture technological capability 
for technological development behind the technology frontier we use direct patent applications 
by residents to their respective national patent offices. In general terms (even though the 
patent strategies may differ from this rule) residents will directly apply for patents in their 
home countries disregarding applications abroad if their technological activities do not have a 
global industrial relevance.20 To us resident direct patent applications to national patent offices 
dominantly proxy technology effort behind the technology frontier. Countries that are behind 
technology frontier should have much higher share of resident patents and their share of 
transnational patents is marginal. However, as they move towards technology frontier their 
transnational patenting increases. This pattern may be somewhat different in very large 
catching up economies where domestic patenting may continue to play important role. 
However, their transnational patenting as proxy of world frontier technology effort should 
continue to increase. 
Figure 3 shows on the left the relationship between transnational patents applications per 
capita (TN) and GDP per capita for the EU12 (developed or core EU), South EU (Greece, Portugal 
and Spain) and the EU CEECs over 1990-2012 period. On the right Figure 1 shows same 
relationship but for WIPO patents per capita i.e. for domestic technology effort. The 
relationship is much better for transnational patents which indicate close relationship with 
levels of GDPpc. 
                                                          
20 We are aware that this strategy is much more relevant for smaller than for larger and more developed 
economies where due to their economic size we may expect that more patents will be registered as priority 
patents i.e both at home and abroad than in small economies. However, this factor in analysis is controlled by 
patents by GDP proxy. 
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Figure 3: Technology intensity at the frontier and behind the frontier vs GDP pc.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: RegPat, World Bank and authors’ calculations 
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2.2. TECHNOLOGY UPGRADING AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE 
 
There is not general theory of structural change but a variety of theoretical approaches of 
different methodological nature that aim to explain structural shifts between three broad 
sectors and among industries within these sectors (Krueger, 200821). There is a common 
understanding that technological changes affect structural change in the way that industries 
with relatively lower rates of productivity growth tend to shrink in terms of shares while those 
with higher rates of productivity growth expand. In this way structural change promotes 
aggregate productivity growth even if we assume that within industries productivity growth 
remains stagnant. However, the empirical evidence on the role of structural change in 
aggregate productivity growth escapes broad generalisations.  It generates positive as well as 
negative contributions to aggregate productivity growth. Since many of these effects net out, 
structural change on average appears to have only a weak impact (Peneder, 200322).  
So, instead of being focused on structural changes at the level of industries it seems more 
appropriate to track changes in the structure of technological knowledge. 
 
We depict structural change in technological knowledge by using two indicators. First, 
transnational patent applications in high technology fields and knowledge-intensive services. 
Second, we use technological diversification index based on Herfindhal index of transnational 
patents across 35 technological fields. This index is based on Lee (201323) who shows that 
catching up from middle income to high income status is accompanied by diversification of 
technological knowledge.  
 
We should expect that latecomer economies have initially highly concentrated structure of 
patents which are diversifying as they are upgrading technologically i.e the number of patents 
categories with patents is increasing. This process should be present in the case of both 
resident and transnational patents. However, we would expect that dispersion of technology 
effort should be more pronounced in the case of transnational than resident patents.  Also, we 
may expect that as countries are catching up that they are increasingly involved in high growth 
patenting areas which are in high tech categories and in knowledge intensive services areas. 
  
                                                          
21
 Krueger, Jens J. (2008) Productivity and structural change: a review of the literature, Journal of Economic Surveys 
(2008) Vol. 22, No. 2, pp. 330–363 
22
 Michael Peneder (2003), Industrial structure and aggregate growth, Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, 
14 (2003): 427-448 
23 Lee, K. (2013) Schumpeterian Analysis of Economic Catch-up Knowledge, Path-Creation, and the Middle-Income 
Trap. Cambridge University Press. 
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2.3. TECHNOLOGY UPGRADING AND INTERACTION WITH GLOBAL ECONOMY 
 
A successful technology upgrading is never entirely autonomous process but is always linked to 
inflow of foreign knowledge skills, which are coupled with intensive domestic technology effort 
(Radosevic, 199924). The key to catch-up and post-catch-up is leverage of domestic innovation 
efforts with global industrial or knowledge networks25. Hence, magnitude of knowledge inflows 
and their coupling to domestic innovations efforts are important dimensions of technology 
upgrading.  A globalisation of technology exploitation and collaboration but also technology 
generation through globalization of R&D process has further increased the importance of 
international linkages for industrial upgrading (UNCTAD,200526). Drawing on the Cross-border 
Ownership approach by Guellec/Pottelsbergue (2001, 2010) we use patent indicators to gauge 
technology sourcing from foreigners as well as interaction or cooperation in technological 
activity with foreign actors. Guellec/Pottelsbergue (200127, 201028) developed the concept of 
the Cross-border Ownership to explore globalization of RD process. We use the indicators from 
the perspective of technology upgrading which leads to slightly different interpretations.  
Technology sourcing from a global perspective and the nature of interaction with foreign actors 
change from the catch up to the post catch up stage, which is reflected in patent indicators. We 
use three indicators to explore these processes. 
 
Foreign Applications of Native Inventions (FANI) measure the extent to which technological 
development in a country or region is driven by foreign actors. This is primarily important in the 
catch-up phase of host countries. If we assume that inventors have the technological 
capabilities and applicants exploit these capabilities commercially, this indicator is a proxy for 
the involvement of foreign actors in the exploitation of native technological capabilities.  
International Co-invention in technological activities (COINV) measure international 
collaboration using patent applications with inventors residing in different countries. The share 
of patents involving inventors from different countries shows the degree to which knowledge 
generation is internationalized.   
Native Applications of Foreign Inventions (NAFI) is a proxy for the exploitation of technological 
capabilities abroad as it measures the extent to which technological development in a country 
is making use of knowledge or technology sourcing from abroad. Arguably, this element 
becomes increasingly important in the later stages of the catch-up phase of host countries and 
might characterize high-income host countries. In that respect, it may be expected that 
                                                          
24
 Radosevic, S. (1999) International technology transfer and catch-up in economic development, Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham.  
25 Ernst, Dieter (2008) Asia’s “upgrading through innovation” 31 strategies and global innovation networks: an 
extension of Sanjaya Lall’s research agenda, Transnational Corporations, Volume 17, Number 3, December 2008 
26
 UNCTAD (2005) World Investment Report, UN, Geneva 
27
 Guellec, D. and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, B. 2001. The internationalisation of technology analysed with 
patent data. Research Policy, 30, 1253-1266. 
28
 Guellec, D. and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, B. 2010, "Measuring the internationalisation of the generation 
of knowledge. An approach based on patent data.," In Handbook of quantitative science and technology research. 
The use of publication and patent statistics in studies on S&T systems, H. F. Moed, W. Glänzel, & U. Schmoch, eds., 
Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 645-662 
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countries behind technology frontier have high share of FANI, are increasingly involved in 
COINV and have smaller share of NAFI. As they are technology upgrading it may be expected 
that share of FANI declines, while shares of COINV and NAFI are increasing. 
3. TECHNOLOGY UPGRADING THROUGH PATENT DATA: COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS 
 
Based on this conceptual framework in this section we analyze patterns of technology 
upgrading of the CEECs but in a comparative context of the EU28 and BRICS economies. We 
consider CEE countries individually as well as groups of EU countries to analyze the 
convergence process in Europe between 1990 and 2011. The groups of countries considered 
are EU12, EU South and CEE. Indicators for these group of countries are built using the average 
across countries within the respective group (CEE, EU12, South EU). Moreover, CEE are 
compared to BRICS. We follow dimensions of technology upgrading as explained in section 2.  
3.1. Intensity of technology upgrading 
As mentioned above, intensity of technology upgrading is reflected on the technology capability 
of the country. To capture domestic technological capability pushing the technology frontier we 
rely on transnational patent applications of domestic applicants compiled from the OECD 
RegPat Dabase (Version January 2014). To capture technological capability for technological 
development behind the technology frontier we use direct patent applications by residents to 
their respective national patent offices. The World International Patent Office (WIPO) provides 
with data on direct applications by resident applicants to their national offices. 
3.1.1. Technological capability pushing the technology frontier 
Drawing on Frietsch and Jung (200929) the counts of transnational patents (TN) include all PCT 
applications whether transferred to the EPO or not and all direct EPO applications without 
precursor PCT application.30  We consider two indicators: Transnational patent applications per 
GDP (TNpGDP) and Transnational Patent Applications per capita (TNpc). TNpGDP captures the 
technology intensity of the economy at the technological frontier.  TNpc capture the technology 
intensity of the country. Figure 4 includes the indicators for different CEE countries and group 
of countries. 
                                                          
29
 Frietsch,  R.  and  Jung,  T.  2009,  Transnational  Patents  -  Structures,  Trends  and  Recent Developments,  
Expertenkommission  Forschung  und  Innovation,  Berlin,  Studien  zum Deutschen Innovationssystem. 7 - 2009. 
Available at http://www.e-fi.de/fileadmin/Studien/StuDIS2009/7_2009_Patentreport_ISI.pdf 
30
 The origin of the invention is defined by the country of residence of the applicants. The indicators use the 
applicant country for the geographic designation of the invention in order to be consistent with the data available 
from WIPO. The application year (rather than the priority year) is considered for the same reason. If an invention 
involves applicants from different countries each country will be assigned with one application (and not a fraction 
of it). 
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Figure 4: Indicators to capture technological capability pushing the technology frontier 
 
Source: OCED RegPat, World Bank and authors’ calculations.  
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In what concerns the European Union, per GDP and per capita indicators of technological 
intensity display strong growth from early 1990s and deceleration of this process after 2008. 
Within EU the data suggest a divergence on core and periphery countries. This is especially 
present in terms of growth of patents until 2008 when patenting in the developed EU12 slows 
down.    
The comparison of CEE with BRICS suggests that in pc terms CEE has higher ‘technology 
intensity of country’ (not economy) than China. China’s catch up started in 2000s not in 1990s 
as CEE. So, this is quite recent phenomenon which is telling about technology upgrading of 
China. A strong catch up CEE in per capita terms is lost in GDP terms while Chinese is not. In 
other words, CEEC as countries have become more patent (technology) intensive but not as 
economies. The increasing/decreasing gap between TN patenting in pc and GDP terms is an 
indicative proxy for increasing or decreasing alignment or misalignment of their National 
Innovation Systems (Tunzelmann et al. 2012)31. 
In the group of CEE countries Slovenia is the clear leader in terms of transnational patents per 
capita. This can be reflection of its very high relative GERD, its high income but also its profile of 
R&D system which may be geared more towards patentable sectors especially pharma and 
chemicals (OECD, 2012: 10832). Estonia is second leader largely. Slovenia is outlier in per capita 
terms but joined with Estonia in GDP terms. Both countries are still above China but given 
differences in size this is remarkable for China and puts all CEE successes in perspective. Among 
CEECs, it is interesting to see that continuous growth of Poland is reflected in transnational 
patents per GDP. Given still very small numbers we consider this to be the reflection rather 
than driver of growth.  
3.1.2. Technological capability behind the technology frontier 
Analog to the use of transnational patents we build per GDP and per capita indicators for the 
period 1990-2012. Figure 5 presents the patent indicators per application year. 
                                                          
31 Tunzelmann, N. von; Günther, Jutta; Wilde, Katja; Jindra, Björn: Interactive Dynamic Capabilities and 
Regenerating the East German Innovation System, in: Contributions to Political Economy, Vol. 29 (1), 2010, pp. 87-
110 
32
 OECD (2012) OECD Review of Innovation Policy: Slovenia, OECD. Paris 
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Figure 5: Indicators to capture technological capability behind the technology frontier 
Source: OCED RegPat, World Bank and authors’ calculations. 
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In overall, there seems to be much less increase in technology intensity of country in terms of 
direct applications to national offices (behind the frontier effort) than in terms of TN patents (at 
world frontier). This is expected given decrease in demand for domestic behind frontier effort 
when compared to imported technology. A stagnant trend in EU28 and in its subregions shows 
the declining importance of technology efforts oriented towards local/national markets (see 
figures 1 and 2 above). This may be expected given continuous economic and institutional 
changes towards European research area and effects of industrial networks in the EU, 
especially between Germany, Austria and Central Europe. Some increase in CE and South EU 
after 2008 is difficult to interpret except as the effect of Structural Funds (at least in CEE and 
increase in GERD/GDP ratios).  
A higher number of direct resident applications per GDP in CEE when compared to the EU12 
shows that in terms of behind the frontier technology effort CEE were high in early 1990s, 
especially given significant decreases in their GDP. On the other hand, a decline of resident 
patents per GDP in CEE shows increasing internationalization of their economies where behind 
the technology frontier effort is being increasingly squeezed by opening of their innovation 
systems. Hence, we observe a strong convergence. However, it seems that the level has now 
stabilized and even slightly increased as the effect of 2008. This is also the case in the EU South. 
In what concerns the comparison between CEE with BRICS, China shows a strong increase of 
both behind and on the frontier technology effort. So, in the case of China we do not observe 
hyper integration features of India or closed economy of Russia but there are elements of 
coupling between domestic and technology frontier. Russia is unique in its persistent and high 
levels of behind the frontier technology effort. This is quite expected given the nature of its 
system of innovation 
Within CEE Slovenia is again leader in terms of ‘technology intensity of country’ (not economy): 
A strong increase after 2008 in Slovenia is probably due to effects of Structural Funds in support 
of domestic RTD system, especially centres of excellence and competence centres. 
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3.2. Breadth of technology upgrading 
To analyze breadth of technology upgrading we focus on features of structural change. This is 
about widening ‘surface’ of technology efforts or increasing number of technology areas in 
which countries get involved or patent as they progress in technology upgrading. We define 
two structural change indicators to measure this process: (i) the relevance of high technology 
and knowledge intensive services patents in the technological activities and (ii) the 
diversification of the technological activities across 35 technological fields.  
3.2.1. High Tech Knowledge Intensive Patents 
 
Using transnational patent applications we consider the share of patents in the high technology 
fields and knowledge intensive services (HKTI). To define high technology we use the EUROSTAT 
definition.33 The indicator used is the share of HTKI patent applications to the total patent 
output in the country per application year. We frame HTKI patents as patents that reflect high 
growth technology areas or ‘dynamic technology frontier patenting activities’. 
Figure 6: Share of HTKI Patents in total patent output per application year (3 Years MA) 
Source: OCED RegPat and authors’ calculations. 
Figure 6 shows the indicator for different countries and groups of countries. The share of HTKI 
patents at technology frontier is on average  6% in CEE, 11.4% in EU15 and 6.1% in South EU. In 
the EU periphery technology activities in currently growing and dynamic areas related to ICT 
presumably are underrepresented. This seems to correspond to an analysis on based priority 
patents (Dominguez Lacasa and Giebler 2014)34. However, there is a positive structural change 
of shifting towards HTKI areas which is strikingly similar in both EU South and CEE.  A decline in 
                                                          
33
 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/metadata/Annexes/htec_esms_an6.pdf (last accessed 13.01.2015) 
34
 Dominguez Lacasa, Iciar; Giebler, Alexander (2014) Technological Activities in CEE Countries: A Patent Analysis 
for the Period 1980-2009, IWH Diskussionspapiere 2/2014, S. 1-36. Available at http://www.iwh-
halle.de/d/publik/disc/2-14.pdf (last accessed January 2015) 
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share of HTKI areas at the EU15 level shows that technology path of EU is quite different from 
US or East Asia. 
BRICs shows a gradual but upward increase in the share of HTKI patents with China having the 
highest share but also decline in the share after 2007/08. This maybe reflects a changing 
orientation of Chinese growth towards more domestic technology based growth (after 2008) 
and technology diversification in transition from middle to high income as argued by Lee 
(201335). The indicator for China nicely shows that its boom does not have anything to do with 
dot.com wave in 2001. The same holds for the other BRIC countries. This suggests that the 
nature of globalization is largely about absorptive capacities of catching up countries not 
catching up at frontier (Radosevic and Yoruk, 201436, OECD 201037). It is quite surprising to 
observe a low share of HTKI of India given possible hypothesis on ‘hyperintegrationist’ mode of 
development as opposed to China. Interestingly, they are on two different sides within the 
BRICS spectrum. Within the BRICS the biggest surprise is India which shows that its 
technological strengths in services are not yet in services that can be captured by patent 
indicators. Its export of software is not of patentable type. 
In general terms CEE falls clearly within BRIC spectrum even in terms of secular increase in 
share of HTKI areas.  
 
3.2.2 Technology diversification 
 
Drawing on Lee’s (2013 38 ) idea that catching up process translate into an increasing 
diversification of technological activities we aim at analysing trends in diversification of 
technological capabilities. To measure technological diversification we use the Herfindhal index 
of transnational patent applications and resident direct patent applications to the national 
offices across 35 technological fields (Schmoch 2008)39. The assignment of an invention to a 
technological sector or specific technology field follows a fractional counting methodology.40 
The Herfindhal index is normalized between 0 and 1. Values close to 1 mean concentration. 
Values close to 0 mean diversification. 
  
                                                          
35
 Lee Keun (2013) Schumpeterian Analysis of Economic Catch-up: Knowledge, Path Creation, and the Middle-
income Trap, Cambridge University Press.  
36
 Slavo Radosevic and Esin Yoruk (2014) Are there global shifts in world science base? Analysis of catching up and 
falling behind of world regions, Scientometrics, June, DOI 10.1007/s11192-014-1344-1 
37
 OECD (2010) Global Perspectives on Development, Shifting Wealth , OECD, Paris. 
38
 Lee, K. (2013) Schumpeterian Analysis of Economic Catch-up Knowledge, Path-Creation, and the Middle-Income 
Trap. Cambridge University Press. 
39
 http://www.wipo.int/ipstats/en/statistics/technology_concordance.html (last accessed 13.01.2015) 
40
 If a transnational patent application includes patent classes that belong to different technological areas or 
technologies a fraction (and not a whole count) will be considered for each technological area or technology. 
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Figure 7: HH-Index: Transnational Patents (3 Years MA) 
 
Source: OCED RegPat and authors’ calculations. 
Figure 8: HH-Index: resident direct patent applications to the national offices (3 Years MA) 
 
Source: OCED RegPat and authors’ calculations. 
The indicators presented in Figures 7 and Figure 8 suggest a clear trend towards diversification 
which is in line with Lee’s (201341) hypothesis and results except for China for TN patents and 
for India for domestic patents. .  
For TN patenting, trends in the EU periphery shows strong diversification though at a somewhat 
higher levels of concentration in CEECs than in the EU South. A diversification trends is feature 
of all CEECs despite their quite different starting levels of concentration/diversification. There is 
strong convergence of both the EU South and CEE to the core which presumably should mean 
that the overall technological knowledge structure in the EU is becoming strongly determined 
by the EU core. However, this trend has slowed down significantly after 2001 despite economic 
growth which was high until 2008.  
Trends towards diversification of technological knowledge are also feature of the BRICs except 
China after 2000. First, we observe very strong diversification of India and CEE which suggest 
technology upgrading via diversification. Second, there is a very slow diversification trend in 
Russia, Brazil and South Africa which may reflect slow structural change in their technology 
systems. Third, China shows opposite trend – towards concentration or decrease in number of 
transnational patent categories. How do we interpret this seemingly counterintuitive trend? 
                                                          
41
 Lee, K. (2013) Schumpeterian Analysis of Economic Catch-up Knowledge, Path-Creation, and the Middle-Income 
Trap. Cambridge University Press. 
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Has China already moved towards technology structure of the upper income economies? Lee 
(2014) shows that diversification is trend in transition from middle to upper income stage after 
which countries continue to specialize. China does not seem to conform to this trend.  
As we would expect diversification is much less pronounced in resident patenting which largely 
reflect domestic and behind the frontier technology effort. The slow tendency towards 
diversification is present in all countries with exception of India after 1997, South EU after 2001 
and China after 2004. Without in depth analyses of each regions technology systems it is quite 
difficult to interpret structural changes in generation of technological knowledge behind 
technology frontier. Also, we see need for further research in exploring diverging vs. converging 
trends between structural change of TN and resident patenting. 
 
3.3. Interaction with the Global Economy 
In general, the key idea here is to use patent based indicators to gauge technology and 
knowledge flows as well as interaction or cooperation in technological activity with foreign 
actors. The flows and the modes of interaction with foreign actors change along the catch up 
process, which should be reflected in the indicators. We use three indicators originally 
developed by Guellec/Pottelsbergue (200142, 201043) to track technology sourcing from a global 
perspective and international knowledge cooperation. 
3.3.1. Foreign applications of National inventions (FANI)  
 
FANI shows the share of TN patents that are invented by inventors in country x but applicants 
are from country y. Guellec/Pottelsbergue (200144, 201045) interpreted the indicators as the 
extent to which technological development in a country or region is driven by foreign actors. A 
large FANI Rate suggests the strong importance of foreign actors exploiting the technological 
activities of a country or region. A low FANI Rate suggests that native inventions are mainly 
applied by native actors.  If we assume that inventors have the technological capabilities and 
applicants have commercial and organizational capabilities this indicator can tell us something 
about the relationship between technical and non-technical capabilities. According to Teece 
(1986) for successful innovation and technological development at the firm level it is not 
                                                          
42 Guellec, D. and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, B. 2001. The internationalisation of technology analysed with 
patent data. Research Policy, 30, 1253-1266. 
43
 Guellec, D. and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, B. 2010, "Measuring the internationalisation of the generation 
of knowledge. An approach based on patent data.," In Handbook of quantitative science and technology research. 
The use of publication and patent statistics in studies on S&T systems, H. F. Moed, W. Glänzel, & U. Schmoch, eds., 
Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 645-662. 
44
 Guellec, D. and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, B. 2001. The internationalisation of technology analysed with 
patent data. Research Policy, 30, 1253-1266. 
45
 Guellec, D. and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, B. 2010, "Measuring the internationalisation of the generation 
of knowledge. An approach based on patent data.," In Handbook of quantitative science and technology research. 
The use of publication and patent statistics in studies on S&T systems, H. F. Moed, W. Glänzel, & U. Schmoch, eds., 
Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 645-662. 
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enough to have technology capabilities but also complementary assets to put these capabilities 
into use. At firm levels this means organisational capabilities in addition to only invention 
capacity. His answer to who actually profits from innovation, pointed to owners of 
complementary assets, particularly when they are specialized and/or co-specialized. So, 
following Teece (1986)46 we interpret large FANI as a proxy for organisational capabilities of 
firms or individuals to commercialize inventions on their own. For firms that are applicants of 
foreign inventions this indicates presence of organisational capabilities to commercialize 
inventions as well as understanding of available technological inventions abroad which are 
patentable. 
From the perspective of complementary or organizational capabilities, a declining FANI rate all 
else equal is a sign of upgrading in complementary or organisational capabilities in the country 
or capacity to profit from their technological activities. Figure 9 presents the indicator for 
different countries and group of countries. 
Figure 9: Rate of Foreign Applications of Native Inventions (FANI Rate) (3 year moving 
averages) 
 
Source: OCED RegPat and authors’ calculations. 
From the complementary or organisational capabilities view, the sudden increase in FANI Rate 
in 1990-1993 in CEE is a reflection of weak organisational capabilities of firms in newly opened 
economies to handle invention process on their own and also of better understanding of 
foreigners what are available technological inventions which are patentable. However, situation 
has stabilised and if we take mid-1990s as the beginning of normal period we do not observe 
improvements in organisational or complementary capabilities. In fact, average between 1995-
1998 and 2010-2012 shows a minor decline in all CEECs. We observe similar weakening of 
complementary capabilities in South EU as well as in the EU12. This trend can be a reflection of 
weakening of these capabilities across Europe (i.e. of declining role of EU large firms as 
organisers of innovation processes) but this can also be a reflection of globalisation of 
innovation process.  
                                                          
46 Teece, David J. 1986, Profiting from technological innovation: Implications for integration, collaboration, 
licensing and public policy. Research Policy 15 (6): 285-305. 
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Given our interpretation of FANI we would expect that successful technology upgrading would 
be reflected in decreasing FANI. Data for BRICs and CEE are in line with this hypothesis. For 
example, China’s FANI rates have declined dramatically reflecting organisational power of 
Chinese MNEs. Indian complementary capabilities as reflected in FANI have improved until 
2001/2002 (dot.com period) and have declined afterwards as reflected in increased FANI 
indices. Russian and especially Brazilian FANI Indices are gradually and slowly decreasing 
reflecting gradually improving complementary capabilities of their firms, especially MNEs. 
Within BRIC context CEE FANI rates seems quite stagnant reflecting possibly very weak 
endogenous organisational capabilities i.e a low share of domestic large firms in technology 
activities.  
 
3.3.2. Indicators for Knowledge Cooperation: Coinventions (COINV) 
 
As countries upgrade technologically their capability for joint international generation of 
inventions should increase. An increase in joint patents also reflects changing nature of 
invention process which is becoming more globalized as depicted also by FANI and NAFI 
indicators.  Guellec/Pottelsbergue (200147, 201048) measure international collaboration using 
patent applications with inventors residing in different countries: the share of patents resulting 
from international research co-operation (inventors from different countries) in the total 
number of patents invented by residents of a given country. Here we use identical measure.  
Figure 10: Share of International Co-Inventions (COINV Rate) (3 year MA) 
 
Source: OCED RegPat and authors’ calculations. 
As given in Figure 10, the indicator shows significant globalization of knowledge generation in 
the EU and in its three sub-regions.  By 2012 in all three sub-regions of the EU around 40% of all 
TN patents applications involve at least one foreign and one domestic inventor (COINV). 
                                                          
47
 Guellec, D. and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, B. 2001. The internationalisation of technology analysed with 
patent data. Research Policy, 30, 1253-1266. 
48
 Guellec, D. and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, B. 2010, "Measuring the internationalisation of the generation 
of knowledge. An approach based on patent data.," In Handbook of quantitative science and technology research. 
The use of publication and patent statistics in studies on S&T systems, H. F. Moed, W. Glänzel, & U. Schmoch, eds., 
Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 645-662. 
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However, there are significant differences in trends between three sub regions.  At EU 
periphery there seems to be stagnation in COINV rates after 2001 (South EU) but especially 
after 2008 (South and CEE). This may possibly reflect the effect of worsening of macroeconomic 
conditions after 2008 on R&D based investment and thus on technology knowledge co-
generation.  
Levels of technology co-generation are lower in BRICS than in the CEE and the rest of the EU. 
Among BRICS China is distinctive as its share of co-inventions declines continually reflecting 
much stronger patenting by Chinese companies themselves. Hence, this relative decline should 
not be confused with absolute very strong growth of Chinese TN patents. Russia and Brazil 
again have similar trend of stagnant COINV rate but given size of these economies the share of 
co-inventing is actually quite high. India’s patenting was during the 1990s more than half based 
on co-inventions but COINV was also rapidly declining reflecting increasing indigenous 
technological capabilities. After 2001 India has been increasingly involved in technology 
cooperation at very high level for such large economy. Again, compared to China it is on the 
other side of the BRIC spectrum. Its share of technology co-inventions is similar now to the CEE 
which is a much smaller region. 
 
3.3.3. National Application of foreign Inventions (NAFI) 
Drawing again on Guellec/Pottelsbergue (2001 49 , 2010 50 ) we compute the share of 
transnational patent applications with applicants located in a country that involve at least one 
inventor located abroad. This indicator is a proxy for the exploitation of technological 
capabilities abroad (Native Applications of Foreign Inventions - NAFI). These patent-based 
indicators aim at measuring the extent to which technological development in a country is 
making use of knowledge or technology sourcing from abroad. Arguably, this element become 
increasingly important in the later stages of the catch-up phase of host countries and might 
characterize high-income host countries. The operationalization follows the logic outline for 
FANI above. Counting transnational applications per application year, the number of 
transnational patents applied by natives and invented by foreigners and (NAFI) is divided by the 
total number of transnational patents with at least one national applicant (NAFI-Rate). From 
the perspective of technology upgrading, we interpret the capacity of countries to source 
technology from abroad as measured by NAFI as the sign of high or increase organizational 
capabilities all else equal. A high or increased NAFI would indicate improvement in these 
capabilities and vice versa. 
  
                                                          
49
 Guellec, D. and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, B. 2001. The internationalisation of technology analysed with 
patent data. Research Policy, 30, 1253-1266. 
50
 Guellec, D. and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, B. 2010, "Measuring the internationalisation of the generation 
of knowledge. An approach based on patent data.," In Handbook of quantitative science and technology research. 
The use of publication and patent statistics in studies on S&T systems, H. F. Moed, W. Glänzel, & U. Schmoch, eds., 
Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 645-662. 
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Figure 11: Rate of Native Applications of Foreign Inventions (FANI Rate) (3 year MA) 
 
Source: OCED RegPat and authors’ calculations. 
Figure 11 includes NAFI rates for different countries and groups of countries. NAFI indices for 
EU regions shows that technology sourcing abroad has initially declined in CEE and has 
remained stagnant and at comparatively very low level since mid-1990s while it has increased 
significantly at EU12 and South EU. Surprisingly levels of NAFI for EU12 and South EU are 
relatively similar which should reflect similar capacities for technology sourcing abroad. Among 
CEECs, there were initial differences in NAFI but these have been gradually converging as times 
goes by. NAFI, which in our context denote capacities for technology sourcing abroad, have 
been stagnant in BRICs which may seems surprising given the newly emerging literature and 
evidence on emerging markets MNEs, some of which have relied on technology sourcing as one 
of their strategies orientations. In particular, declining NAFI of China seems to suggest that 
despite individual high profile cases of BRICS MNEs sourcing technology abroad these cases do 
not yet represent trend or technology sourcing is not their key strategic orientation. However, 
we should bear in mind that NAFI or share of transnational patent applications with applicants 
located in a country that involve at least one inventor located abroad is quotient and we should 
bear in mind that it is dependent on total number of TN patents. A catching up country that has 
high and growing number of TN patents but still low number of its patents invented abroad is 
actually doing still better than country that has high NAFI but low number of its TN patents. This 
is exactly the case between the CEE and China where former has higher NAFI but much lower 
number of TN patents.  
 
4. TECHNOLOGICAL UPGRADING IN EUROPE IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
In this section we merge three dimensions and all indicators into one graphic form – network 
diagram -   to explore levels and patterns of changes of technology upgrading. Each graphic 
includes 7 indicators. The technological intensity of a country is represented by the number of 
patent applications by residents at the national filing office per GDP (domestic technological 
intensity) and the by the number of transnational patent applications by national applicants per 
GDP (frontier technological intensity).  The breadth of technological upgrading is represented 
by share of high tech knowledge intensive transnational patent applications in total 
transnational patent applications (High tech patents) and the degree of concentration of patent 
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applications by residents at the national filing of the country across 35 technological areas 
(specialisation). The technological interaction with the global economy is represented by three 
indicators: The share of applications with at least one national applicant and at least one 
foreign inventor in total transnational inventions filed by at least one national applicant (NAFI 
Rate); the share of foreign applications with at least one foreign applicant and at least one 
national inventor in total transnational applications with at least one national inventor (FANI 
Rate); and the share of transnational patent applications involving at least one foreign as well 
as one domestic inventor in the total number of transnational patent applications invented by 
at least one native (COINV Rate). 
First, we analyze each of the CEE countries in comparison to other EU countries at a particular 
point in time (2011). In a second section we explore the position of the CEE in relation to BRICS 
using identical approach. 
4.1. Technological upgrading in the EU 
We consider the seven indicators for CEE countries for the year 2011. In addition, we indicate 
the relative change in percent for each indicator for the respective CEE country in comparison 
to the year 1995 (or the latest available). In the diagrams we compare each of the eleven CEE 
countries to the other ten CEE countries, South European countries as well as EU12 countries. 
The values for each indicator used for graphical representation are scaled between 0 and 1 
using all country values for 26 EU countries . Then we generated simple unweighted average for 
the other ten CEE countries, the group of South European economies as well as the group of 
the EU12 countries. Thus, the graphical space represented by the seven dimensions in each of 
the diagrams corresponds to the possible maximum values by 26 EU countries at the point of 
observation (2011). 
Figure 12 and Figure 13 bellow show the profile of technology upgrading of the individual CEECs 
in relation to the EU12, South EU and other CEECs. We do not go into detailed description of 
profiles of each of 11 CEECs but draw only two general conclusions. First, technology upgrading 
profiles of the CEECs are pretty homogenous which reflects their technological levels and 
relative distance to the EU-12. A typical CEE economy is well behind EU12 in terms of frontier 
technology intensity, domestic technological intensity, share of high tech patents and 
technology sourcing abroad (NAFI). Its organizational capabilities are often less advanced as 
reflected in high share of FANI.  The CEE profile is much less coherent in terms of technology 
diversification/specialization and share of joint inventions. Second, differences among CEECs 
are not significant in the sense that we can talk of distinct national technology profiles. Poland, 
Romania and Slovenia have above average domestic technological intensity which reflects 
partly their sizes (Romania and Poland) and specific model of innovation system reliant on 
domestic R&D intensive firms (Slovenia). Latvia and Lithuania are specific in terms of high share 
of HTKI patents. 
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Figure 12: 2011 Indicators for Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Croatia, Hungary and 
Lithuania. Comparison with EU 12, South EU and other CEE 
 
Source: OCED RegPat, WIPO, World Bank and authors’ calculations. 
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Figure 13: 2011 Indicators for Latvia, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, and Slovakia. Comparison 
with EU 12, South EU and other CEE 
 
Source: OCED RegPat, WIPO, World Bank and authors’ calculations. 
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4.2. Technological upgrading of Emerging Economies 
Again, using network diagrams we aim at a graphical presentation of changes in the selected 
indicators for each of the three dimensions of technological upgrading for the CEE region in 
comparison to the BRICS countries between 1995 and 2011.   
First we create two summary network diagrams that integrate all countries under observation 
in 1995 and 2011 to show the change in structural indicators in these selected emerging 
economies and the CEE region (Figure 14).  Next, we offer a diagram for the CEE region and 
each of the BRICS countries (Figure 15) based on seven indicators in 1995 and 2011. The values 
for BRICS are country specific. For the CEE region we create a simple unweighted average for 
across the eleven CEE countries. Before drawing the graphs, we scale all indicators for the 
BRICS countries and the CEE region between 0 and 1. Thus, the graphical space represented by 
the seven dimensions in each of the diagrams corresponds to the possible maximum values by 
the BRICS countries and the CEE region in 1995 and 2011.  
 
Figure 14: Indicators for BRICS and CEE (average) in 1995 and 2011 
 
Source: OCED RegPat, WIPO, World Bank and authors’ calculations. 
 
A comparison of the CEECs and BRICS profiles in 1995 and 2011 offers few very interesting 
insights. First, 1995 profiles are more diverse than 2011 reflecting divergences and 
convergences among these catching-up economies. In 1995, Russia had distinctive prolife 
characterised by comparatively the highest both domestic and frontier technological intensity 
and together with China the highest share of high tech patents. CEE had the least diversified 
technological knowledge portfolio with comparatively high frontier technological intensity. 
China had the highest FANI rate which by 2011 became the lowest next to Brazil reflecting 
increase organisational capabilities of their MNEs to commercialize their own inventions. India 
had very low ranking on all dimensions of technological upgrading except in terms of NAFI or 
sourcing technology abroad. This quite diverse set of profiles changed significantly by 2011. 
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China has delinked from BRICS by highly increased domestic and frontier technological intensity 
as well as by very high share of high-tech patents.  CEE has lost its initial high ranking in terms 
of frontier technological intensity, has significantly diversified its technological knowledge, 
increased co invention rate but also became the region with the highest FANI rate which 
reflects weak organisational capabilities to commercialize its own inventions. India has 
continued to be comparatively the strongest in sourcing technology abroad but it also reduced 
diversification of its technology portfolio of inventions. Other BRICS – Russia, Brazil and South 
Africa – have features which fall within these three specific cases of China, CEE and India. Russia 
has lost its advantages in terms of the highest frontier and domestic technological intensity. In 
overall, we have seen a shift from much more diverse technology upgrading profiles in 1995 
towards four profiles: China, CEE, India and rest of BRICS (Russia, Brazil and South Africa). 
Next, we explore in greater detail changes in between 1995 and 2011 by each of BRICs and CEE 
(Figure 15). CEE technology upgrading profile has substantially changed in between 1995 and 
2011. Its technology intensity, both at frontier and domestic, has been declined and its 
openness has significantly changed as shown by increased co-invention, NAFI and FANI rates. 
On positive side, its technology profile has diversified as should be expected when countries are 
transiting from middle towards high income status. Also, its capacity for sourcing technology 
abroad has also somewhat improved. However, invention process in CEE has become much less 
intensive but it is now taking place in cooperation with foreign partners (COINV) who have 
organisational capabilities to commercialize local inventions (NAFI). The CEE case contains 
interesting lessons regarding costs and benefits in terms of openness and autonomy of 
technology systems. 
Changes in profile of Russian technology upgrading have been similar but also much more 
dramatic when compared to the CEE. First, its decline of frontier and domestic technological 
intensity has been much sharper than in the CEE. Also its share of high tech patents has 
significantly declined. This loss of technology intensity of CEE has been compensated by stringer 
interaction with global economy through high coinvention rate which was not the case in 
Russia. Also, its FANI and NAFI rates have remained relatively unchanged. As in CEE, there has 
been positive tendency of increased technological diversification.  
China’s profile of technology upgrading shows very strong increase in both domestic as well as 
in frontier technological intensity at the same share of high tech patents. On the other hand, 
technological upgrading was not followed by its increased technological openness. Its 
coinvention rate has dropped significantly and its capacity for sourcing technology abroad has 
declined somewhat. FANI rate for China has declined dramatically which actually shows 
increased capability of its MNEs to commercialize their own inventions. Given huge increases in 
China’s technological intensity this dimension of interaction with global economy should be 
seen in relative terms as relatively less intensive given much higher increase in technological 
intensity.  In this respect, a Chinese model of technology upgrading is quite different from the 
CEE which had to compensate its decreasing technological intensity by more technological 
openness.  
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India has very low technological intensity which despite its high economic growth in this period 
has further shrank questioning whether its further growth can rely on technology or on other 
production factors. Similar to CEE India has to compensate much less dramatic loss of 
technology intensity by increase knowledge cogeneration (COINV). Its capacity to source 
technology from abroad has remained constant but its technology portfolio has further 
concentrated which is not the best basis for technology upgrading of such a large economy. 
Changes in Brazilian technology upgrading profile have been much less intensive when 
compared to China, Russia, and CEE. Relatively small decreases in technology intensity and in 
share of high tech patents have also resulted like in CEE and India to increases in knowledge 
cogeneration at relatively similar NAFI and FANI rates. South Africa followed similar pattern as 
its domestic and especially frontier technology intensity have declined as well as share of high 
tech patents. As in Brazil, CEE and India this has led to increases in co-invention rates and with 
slight changes in NAFI and FANI rates at unchanged degree of technology diversification. 
Figure 15: Indicators for BRICS and CEE (average) in 1995 and 2011 
 
Source: OCED RegPat, WIPO, World Bank and authors’ calculations. 
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5. EXPLORING DIMENSIONS OF TECHNOLOGICAL UPGRADING  
So far, we focused on identifying differences and changes to the technological profile of CEE 
countries in comparison to other European economies and the BRICS countries by using 
selected patent based indicators. In the final part of the analysis, we aim to explore all three 
dimension of technological upgrading: technology intensity, structural changes and knowledge 
interaction with global economy. We have departed from the proposition that technology 
upgrading is multidimensional process and these three dimensions are different facets of this 
complex process. 
Statistically, it is possible to create a simple composite indicator of technological upgrading 
based on selected indicators across countries within the observation period. In order to this, we 
need to make some assumptions about the relation between our indicators and technological 
upgrading. This seems straight forward in case of technological capability or intensity. Here we 
assume that a higher value for technological intensity with regard to domestic or frontier 
technology corresponds to a higher stage in technological development of the country. Second 
we assume that the breadth of technological upgrading is higher, if the share of high tech 
knowledge intensive patents in transnational patent applications is higher as well as the degree 
of diversification of domestic technological activity across technological areas is higher. Finally, 
we assume that higher NAFI rates (i.e. transnational patent applications with national 
applicants and foreign inventors) correspond to stages of higher technological development as 
capacity of countries to source technology globally increases. In turn, we assume that lower 
FANI rates (i.e. transnational patent applications with foreign applicants and national inventors 
in total transnational inventions) corresponds to stages of higher technological development as 
countries organisation capabilities to commercialize inventions generated in their own country 
increases. Finally, we assume that COINV Rates (i.e. transnational patent applications involving 
at least one foreign as well as one domestic inventor in the total number of transnational 
patent applications with national applicants) should decline as countries develop technology 
capability to invent but also to commercialize their own inventions. 
However, we think that constructing a composite indicator of technology upgrading would defy 
our main analytical aim in this paper which is to understand the interactions between different 
dimensions of technology upgrading and their changes. ‘Burying’ different dimensions and their 
interactions into one composite indicator is in contradiction to our departing proposition to 
build metrics which takes into account different drivers of technology upgrading. Synthesizing 
three relatively independent but related processes – technology intensification, structural 
changes and knowledge exchange - into one indicator leads to decontextualized metrics. Given 
generally poor understanding of the processes of technology upgrading each of the above 
stated assumptions can more or less stand scrutiny but only as a stylized fact on its own. 
However, we are much less certain about their mutual interaction and whether the overall 
construct or composite indicator of technology upgrading is really theoretically and statistically 
grounded.   
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In view of these limitations as well as of the greater learning potential in exploring different 
dimensions of technology upgrading, we present summary sub-indexes for each of three 
dimensions of technology upgrading. Our analysis uses information for 1995 and 2011. 
Following the above outlined assumptions we inverse the original values for the indicators 
Herfindhal, FANI Rate and COINV Rates for each country. Using values for the year 1995 (or the 
earliest year available) we rank each of the seven indicators separately, where the highest value 
corresponds to the highest rank. Then we add the ranks across the relevant indicators for each 
dimension for each country. The ranking of technological intensity is based on measures for 
domestic and frontier patenting intensity. The measure of diversification of domestic inventions 
and the relative importance of inventions in high tech and knowledge intensive activities are 
grouped into the indicator for structural changes. Finally FANI, NAFI and COINV rates are group 
into the ranking of interaction with the global economy. We give each indicator equal weigh 
into one composite indicator for each dimension. The country with the lowest sum has the 
highest overall rank per dimension. The procedure is repeated for the 2011 values. Finally we 
can identify relative changes in the ranking for each of the country between 1995 and 2011 in 
each dimension of technology upgrading. It is important to realize that this is not composite 
indicator of the overall technology upgrading but of upgrading as reflected in patent data. In 
that respect, this indicator shares all virtues and drawbacks of patents as indicators. 
We need to acknowledge that the five indicators used to measure breadth and global 
interaction of technological upgrading are measures independent from the underlying ‘size’ or 
intensity of patenting activity. For example, similarly low FANI rates (i.e. high rankings) are 
obtained in case of Malta and Finland in 2011. However, Finland has the second highest 
technological intensity and Malta is ranked 22. The FANI rate is calculated with a base of 39 
transnational patent applications in case of Malta and with 2.324 in case of Finland. The 
distortion is amplified in case of the NAFI rates. As a result Malta comes in first on the ranking 
for global interaction. Similar cases apply basically to all CEE countries in the year 1995 and to 
the majority of smaller CEE countries (Baltic economies) still in 2011. Given the upward bias in 
the rankings of structural change and global interaction for countries with low or very low 
frontier or domestic technological intensity, we need to interpret the ranking dynamics of the 
corresponding countries with appropriate caution. 
Having these limitations in mind the ranking dynamics suggest the following: 
1. Technological intensity:  China has increased by far the most its patenting intensity due to 
remarkable increase of both TN and resident patents. Still, Germany and Finland are two of the 
most technology (patent) intensive economies. Given their income levels China and Slovenia 
are surprisingly highly located. This indicates their high potential for technology upgrading but 
also it shows that their current growth is not yet based on R&D. Russia’s relatively high position 
is largely due to domestic technology effort. CEE (with exception of Slovenia) are firmly in the 
second half of table together with South EU which is expected given that drivers of their growth 
are not related to technology but to production capability.  
33 
 
Table 1: Dimension of technology upgrading: patent-based rankings 1995-2011 
 Technological intensity Structural Change Global Interaction  
Country 1995 2011 Change 1995 2011 Change 1995 2011 Change 
Germany 2 1 1 6 26 -20 13 11 2 
Finland 1 2 -1 5 2 3 10 2 8 
China 18 3 15 15 1 14 19 23 -4 
Slovenia 7 4 3 16 30 -14 5 16 -11 
France 8 5 3 3 5 -2 14 9 5 
Denmark 12 6 6 12 15 -3 12 8 4 
Austria 10 7 3 21 20 1 11 13 -2 
Sweden 3 8 -5 2 6 -4 6 3 3 
Latvia 14 9 5 30 31 -1 28 22 6 
Netherlands 13 10 3 9 14 -5 3 5 -2 
Russia 4 11 -7 7 29 -22 25 30 -5 
Romania 16 12 4 31 32 -1 31 25 6 
United Kingdom 6 13 -7 1 4 -3 18 18 0 
Luxembourg 19 14 5 29 23 6 23 6 17 
Hungary 9 15 -6 24 22 2 26 32 -6 
Italy 15 16 -1 8 25 -17 4 26 -22 
Estonia 33 17 11 32 8 24 30 12 18 
Poland 20 18 2 19 13 6 27 29 -2 
India 30 19 11 27 24 3 17 33 -16 
Czech Republic 22 20 2 13 18 -5 9 27 -18 
Bulgaria 5 21 -16 11 11 0 24 21 3 
Malta 28 22 6 33 33 0 1 1 0 
Belgium 21 23 -2 4 9 -5 16 14 2 
Ireland 11 24 -13 14 10 4 15 4 11 
Croatia 17 25 -8 18 21 -3 21 28 -7 
Spain 25 26 -1 10 3 7 8 19 -11 
Lithuania 26 27 -1 23 27 -4 33 10 23 
Cyprus 27 28 -1 25 17 8 7 7 0 
Brazil 29 29 0 22 12 10 22 31 -9 
South Africa 23 30 -7 20 19 1 32 24 8 
Greece 31 31 0 26 16 10 29 20 9 
Portugal 32 32 0 28 7 21 2 17 -15 
Slovakia 24 33 -9 17 28 -11 20 15 5 
Sources: OCED RegPat, WIPO, World Bank and authors’ calculations. Authors calculation. 
The underlying indicators for technological intensity are strongly shaped by industry structure 
and favor those economies where ‘patenting industries’ like chemicals and pharma are 
important. This partly explains the relatively high position of Slovenia.  As technology intensity 
measure does not differentiate between frontier and behind the frontier patenting some 
economies will be higher than expected (Russia, Romania) or lower than expected (United 
Kingdom, Ireland). Based on patenting intensity BRICs are not homogenous entity but widely 
differing group with thus very different opportunities for growth based on technology. 
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Beside China the biggest improver in terms of technology intensity (in relative ranking) are 
Estonia and India. Bulgaria and Ireland have fallen substantially behind similar to fall behind of 
Russia, Romania, Croatia and South Africa. 
2. Structural changes as depicted through indicators of patent diversification and shift towards 
high tech patenting is favoring countries behind the frontier as they have much more scope for 
convergence or reaching structure of the frontier economies. China and Estonia are again the 
biggest improvers, which is quite important additional evidence of their technology upgrading 
given that China is third ranked and Estonia 17th in terms of technological intensity. The biggest 
improver in terms of structural change is actually Portugal but it has also a fairly low 
technological intensity.  
The smallest structural changes can be observed for Russia and Germany but for quite different 
reasons. Germany is at the technology frontier and it may be expected that it will further 
specialize. In fact, several technology intensive and high income economies are located very 
low in terms of technology diversification (Germany, Austria, Denmark, Italy). Finland is quite 
specific in the sense that it is technology intensive economy but also with high degree of 
diversification of patent portfolio. As we would expect it has reached limits of diversification 
and thus has not further improved in that respect. Russia in contrast lost considerable ground 
in terms of frontier and domestic technological intensity, which seems to have been paralleled 
by a narrowing diversification of domestic technological activity as well as a massive drop in the 
share of high tech patenting.  
As outlined above our underlying approach is aimed to measure technology upgrading of 
middle income economies towards high income. This is clearly visible from changes in relative 
position in terms of structural change where five economies from the bottom group in terms of 
technology intensity are major diversifiers in expected direction while from the top group only 
China belongs to the biggest diversifiers. Germany as economy at technology frontier has 
reached saturation in that respect and has been actually specializing. So, within our framework 
indicators of structural change do not have a priory positive or negative interpretation. This 
depends on where countries stand in relation to the technology frontier.  
3. Global interaction in patenting inventions is composed of three indicators (FANI, COINV and 
NAFI rates) that indicate different stages and modes of interaction with global economy as 
countries are technologically upgrading. So, identical change in degree of openness should be 
interpreted in the context of technological level of economy and the actual mechanism of 
interaction. The biggest changes in terms of increased openness in patenting activities took 
place in Lithuania, Estonia, Luxemburg and Ireland while the biggest relative ‘withdrawals’ took 
place in Italy, Portugal, Slovenia, Czech Republic and Spain. It is interesting to see that 
‘globalizaton of technology’ is not universal process but evolves very unevenly reflecting very 
much country specific interactions between national technology systems and external 
environment.  
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The Chinese system is quite autonomous given its high technology intensity and direction of 
structural change in patenting portfolio. Latvian technology system has generated in narrow 
technology area high technology intensity but unlike neighboring Lithuania it is actually very 
little open in terms of knowledge exchange. On the other hand, Finnish system is technology 
intensive, quite diversified and also very open by being ranked second in terms of interaction 
intensity. Also, Swedish system is quite open and relatively highly ranked in terms of both 
diversity of patent portfolio and technology intensity. Slovenia as very technology intensive 
economy has not opened in terms of knowledge exchange but it has actually closed further in 
relative terms. Italy as large EU economy has further ‘delinked’ while its technology intensity 
remains medium.   
With the exception of South Africa the BRICS have in relative terms not further opened up but 
actually have reduced their ranking positions in terms of global interactions at very different 
levels of technology intensity. For example, China and India reduced the relative ranking 
positions in terms of global interaction with increasing technological intensity, whereas Russia 
lost relative ground in terms technological intensity as well as global interaction. This is 
contrasted by the development in South Africa, which also observed drop of its relative position 
in terms of technological intensity but at the same time score relatively higher in terms of 
global interaction. This raises interesting issues about the role of autonomy and openness in 
technology system in the catching-up process. However, our data only allows the interpretation 
of changing positions in global interaction in relative terms looking at EU and BRICS economies. 
Each of them may have become more or less open in their own terms as we observed above 
(see for example Figure 11). 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
This report measures patterns of technology upgrading as three-dimensional process which 
consists of (i) intensity of technology upgrading, (ii) structural change, and (iii) interaction with 
the global economy. All three dimensions have strong grounding in the respective literatures on 
firm level technology upgrading, on structural change and growth, and on integration of 
technological activities in the global economy.  We compare countries in terms of technological 
levels and changes along their own upgrading paths as reflected in these three dimensions.   
The specificity of our report is that, considering the 3 dimensions, we depict patterns of 
technology upgrading by relying entirely on patent data. This has its major advantages in terms 
of length and consistency of time series derived as well as in the possibility to identify 
technological fields or specializations based on patent classifications.  
The indicators for intensity of technology upgrading trace technological capabilities at the 
technology frontier and behind the technology frontier. Transnational patent applications (TN) 
capture inventions pushing the technology frontier while resident direct patent applications to 
national patent offices dominantly proxy technology effort behind the technology frontier. It 
may be expected that as countries technologically upgrade their patent intensity increases and 
shifts form resident toward TN patents.  
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Structural change in technological knowledge is depicted by using transnational patent 
applications in high technology fields and knowledge-intensive services and by a technological 
diversification index based on Herfindhal index of transnational patents across 35 technological 
fields. Drawing on Lee (201351) we assume that technology upgrading of middle income 
economies is depicted by increasing diversification of their technology profiles in terms of 
patents while this is not necessarily the case with high income economies.  
To capture interaction with global economy in the upgrading process we focus on technological 
knowledge sourcing across countries and interactions between foreign and indigenous actors. 
We draw on indicators developed by Guellec/ Pottelsbergue (2001, 2010). We apply them for 
exploring technology upgrading which leads to new perspectives in their interpretation.  
Technology sourcing and the nature of interactions with foreign actors change from the catch 
up to the post catch up stage, which is reflected in patent indicators. We use three indicators. 
Foreign Applications of Native Inventions (FANI) measure the extent to which technological 
development in a country or region is driven by foreign actors. International Co-invention in 
technological activities (COINV) measure international collaboration using patent applications 
with inventors residing in different countries. Native Applications of Foreign Inventions (NAFI) 
measure the extent to which a country is able to exploit technological knowledge from abroad. 
It may be expected that countries behind technology frontier do not have the organizational 
capabilities to exploit their own technological knowledge which is then exploited by foreign 
actors (high share of FANI), they increasingly interact with foreign partners for technology 
development (increasing COINV) but do not have the capabilities for exploiting foreign 
knowledge by themselves (smaller share of NAFI). As they are technology upgrading it may be 
expected that share of FANI declines, while shares of COINV and NAFI are increasing. 
 Based on these indicators and modes of interpretation our comparative analysis focuses on 
EU27 and its subregions (EU-12, CEE and South EU) and on the BRICS countries. We identify the 
following developments.  
In terms of intensity of technology upgrading we observe different trends in the accumulation 
of technological capabilities at the technology frontier and behind the technology frontier, 
especially in what concerns CEE.  
On the one hand, all parts of the EU28 have increased their technological capabilities pushing 
the technology frontier.  TN patenting in the EU display strong growth from early 1990s and 
deceleration of this process after 2008. Within EU the data suggest a divergence on core (EU12) 
and periphery (CEE and South EU) countries which has been especially present until 2008 when 
patenting in the developed EU12 slows down.    
The comparison of CEE with BRICS suggests that in pc terms CEE has the highest TN patents in 
pc terms. However, CEE are well behind China in terms of TN per GDP or in technology intensity 
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of economy as measured by TN patents. Nonetheless, CEE is ahead of other BRICs. In terms of 
technology intensity at the world frontier CEE has advanced but it is beset by structural issues 
as reflected by big difference between lower technology intensity of its economy vs. higher 
intensity of country.  
On the other hand, when it comes to technology effort behind technology frontier as measured 
by resident patents we observe a stagnant trend in EU28 and in its subregions. This may be 
expected given continuous economic and institutional changes towards European research area 
and effects of industrial networks in the EU. A strong decline of resident patents per GDP in CEE 
is the effect of their increasing internationalization and substitution of domestic technology 
effort by opening of their innovation systems.  
In terms of structural change, there is a shift towards HTKI areas in both EU South and CEE 
towards EU12 shares.  This is reflection of the strong convergence of both the EU South and 
CEE to the core which presumably means that the overall technological knowledge structure in 
the EU is becoming strongly determined by the EU core. However, a decline in share of HTKI 
areas at the EU12 level shows that technology path of EU is quite different from the US or East 
Asia. CEE falls clearly within BRIC spectrum in terms of share of HTKI patents.  
What concerns the diversification of patent portfolios, there is a clear trend towards 
diversification in BRICS and CEE except for China in terms TN patents and for India in terms 
resident patents. A diversification trends is feature of all CEECs despite their quite different 
starting levels of concentration/diversification.  As we would expect, diversification is much less 
pronounced in resident patenting which largely reflect domestic and behind the frontier 
technology effort.  
With regard to technology upgrading and the interaction with global economy in terms of 
technology sourcing and interaction with foreign actors, the results for CEE match our 
expectations to some extent. Given our interpretation of FANI we would expect that successful 
technology upgrading would be reflected in decreasing FANI. Data for CEE and for BRICS are in 
line with this hypothesis. Within BRICS context CEE FANI rates seem quite stagnant reflecting 
possibly very weak endogenous organisational capabilities i.e a low share of domestic large 
firms in technology activities. Another strong feature of the CEE is a high share of coinventions. 
In all three sub-regions of the EU around 40% of all TN patents applications involve at least one 
foreign and one domestic inventor (COINV). Levels of technology co-generation are lower in 
BRICS than in the CEE and the rest of the EU which may be expected.  
Interestingly, NAFI Rates for EU regions show that technology sourcing abroad has initially 
declined in CEE and has remained stagnant and at comparatively very low level since mid-1990s 
while it has increased significantly at EU12 and South EU. NAFI, which in our context denote 
capacities for technology sourcing abroad, have been stagnant in BRICs which may seems 
surprising given the newly emerging literature and evidence on emerging markets MNEs. It 
seems that despite individual high profile cases of BRICS MNEs sourcing technology abroad, 
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these cases do not yet represent trend or technology sourcing is not their key strategic 
orientation.  
To identify specific technology upgrading paths for the different regions and countries we 
develop technological upgrading profiles involving al indicators. These upgrading profiles have 
been used for the comparative analysis in 2011 and 1995. 
In 2011 CEECs were quite homogenous in their upgrading profiles which reflects their 
technological levels and relative distance to the EU-12. A typical CEE economy in 2011 is well 
behind EU12 in terms of frontier technology intensity, behind frontier technology intensity, 
share of high tech patents and technology sourcing abroad (NAFI). Moreover, its organizational 
capabilities are often less advanced as reflected in high share of FANI.  The CEE profile is much 
less coherent in terms of technology diversification/specialization and share of joint inventions. 
However, differences among CEECs are not significant in the sense that we can talk of distinct 
national technology profiles. Still there are some notable national features. Poland, Romania 
and Slovenia have above average domestic technological intensity which reflects partly their 
sizes (Romania and Poland) and specific model of innovation system reliant on domestic R&D 
intensive firms (Slovenia). Latvia and Lithuania are specific in terms of high share of HTKI 
patents. 
Technology upgrading profiles of BRICs and CEECs for 1995 are more diverse than for 2011 
reflecting divergences and convergences among these catching-up economies. CEE had the 
least diversified technological knowledge portfolio with comparatively high frontier 
technological intensity.  By 2011 CEE has lost its initial high ranking in terms of frontier 
technological intensity, has significantly diversified its technological knowledge, increased co 
invention rate but also became the region with the highest FANI rate which reflects weak 
organisational capabilities to commercialize its own inventions. On positive side, its technology 
profile has diversified as should be expected when countries are transiting from middle towards 
high income status. Also, its capacity for sourcing technology abroad has also somewhat 
improved. However, invention process in CEE has become much less intensive but it is now 
taking place in cooperation with foreign partners (COINV) who have organisational capabilities 
to commercialize local inventions (NAFI).  
These changes in the CEE technology upgrading profiles contrast well with BRIC countries. 
Changes in profile of Russian technology upgrading have been similar but also much more 
dramatic when compared to the CEE. Its decline of frontier and domestic technological 
intensity has been much sharper than in the CEE. This loss of technology intensity of CEE has 
been compensated by stronger interaction with global economy through high coinvention rate 
which has not been the case in Russia.  
China’s profile of technology upgrading shows very strong increase in both domestic as well as 
in frontier technological intensity at the same share of high tech patents. On the other hand, 
technological upgrading was not followed by its increased technological openness. In this 
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respect, a Chinese model of technology upgrading is quite different from the CEE which had to 
compensate its decreasing technological intensity by more technological openness.  
India has very low technological intensity which despite its high economic growth in this period 
has further shrank questioning whether its further growth can rely on technology or on other 
production factors. Similar to CEE, India has to compensate much less dramatic loss of 
technology intensity by increase knowledge cogeneration (COINV).  
Changes in Brazilian technology upgrading profile have been much less intensive when 
compared to China, Russia, and CEE. Relatively small decreases in technology intensity and in 
share of high tech patents have also resulted like in CEE and India to increases in knowledge 
cogeneration at relatively similar NAFI and FANI rates. South Africa followed similar pattern as 
its domestic and especially frontier technology intensity have declined as well as share of high 
tech patents. As in Brazil, CEE and India this has led to increases in co-invention rates and with 
slight changes in NAFI and FANI rates at unchanged degree of technology diversification. 
Finally, considering all EU28 economies plus BRICS we rank the countries according to each 
indicator in the years 1995 and 2011. By adding ranks we calculate one rank for each of the 
three dimensions. The goal is to identify relative changes in the rankings for each of the 
countries between 1995 and 2011 in each dimension of technology upgrading.  
In terms of technology intensity, CEE (with exception of Slovenia) are firmly among the low 
performers (holing positions in second half of the ranking) together with South EU. This is 
expected given that drivers of their growth are not related to technology but to production 
capability. In this dimension BRICs are not a homogenous entity. Their positions in terms of 
technology intensity differ widely signaling very different opportunities for growth based on 
technology. China has increased by far the most due to remarkable increase of both TN and 
resident patents. 
In what concerns structural change, economies that are weak in terms of technology (patent) 
intensity show large changes in their benchmark position in terms of structural change. These 
results are in line with our assumption of structural change underlying technology upgrading of 
middle income economies towards high income. China and Estonia are again the biggest 
improvers in terms of ranking which is a quite important additional evidence of their 
technology upgrading given that China is third ranked and Estonia 17th in terms of technology 
(patent) intensity.  
The biggest changes in terms of increased openness in patenting activities took place in 
Lithuania, Estonia, Luxemburg and Ireland while the biggest relative ‘withdrawals’ took place in 
Italy, Portugal, Slovenia, Czech R and Spain. Our data shows that ‘globalizaton of technology’ is 
not universal process but evolves very unevenly reflecting very much country specific 
interactions between national technology systems and external environment. Interestingly, 
four out of five BRICS (with exception of South Africa) have not further opened in terms of 
knowledge exchange in terms of patenting. This suggests that despite foreign presence in R&D 
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in these economies, in particular China and India, this by itself has not led to relatively higher 
openness of their technology systems. 
In overall, our analysis puts the upgrading paths of the EU28 and CEE in the context of BRICS 
and shows strong and weak features of the CEE technology upgrading. Our research shows 
clearly that paths of technology upgrading are very country specific though differences among 
CEECs are relatively much less present than when compared to BRICS.  
CEECs are positioned relatively well in terms of technology intensity at the world technology 
frontier though their economic growth is not triggered by these type of technology activities. 
Our data indicate lower technology intensity of the CEE as economies (TN/GDP) vs. their 
relatively higher technology intensity as countries (TNCpc). This is an indication of mismatches 
in innovation systems of the CEECs especially regarding the relationships between technology 
activities in business and public sectors. These mismatches will need to be addressed so that 
the technology activities outside BES could be made more economically relevant.  
Nonetheless, CEE technology upgrading as depicted by patents is within the BRIC pattern (with 
exception of China which in terms of technology upgrading has de facto delinked from BRICS). 
In the BRIC context, the CEE characterize very open innovation system with a high share of 
coinventions and high FANI rates but also weak organizational capabilities to commercialize its 
own inventions. 
In terms of relative changes in technology upgrading CEE are firmly in the lower half of the 
EU28 list together with four out of five BRICS (except China and Slovenia). The only really big 
relative improver in terms of technology intensity is Estonia while other countries have 
recorded much less significant relative changes. Diversification of their technology profiles as 
proxy for technology upgrading of middle income economies is also well behind Chinese 
changes again with the exception of Estonia. The interaction of CEE with the global economy in 
terms of knowledge exchange interaction with global economy in overall is also not very strong 
again with exception of Lithuania and Estonia.  
In overall, CEE region shows good relative position in relation to BRICs but degree of changes in 
technology upgrading between 1995-2011 falls within BRIC (except China) spectrum. The 
biggest difference compared to BRICS is much higher openness of CEE in terms of patent 
generation and weak control of patenting process. We interpret this as reflection of weak 
organizational capabilities of the CEE larger local firms.  A specific position of the CEE as part of 
the EU has huge implications on how technology upgrading will evolve.  Also, given their size, 
the policy approaches to technology upgrading in the CEE are and will continue to be quite 
different when compared to BRICs. However, the challenge to couple domestic with foreign 
technology efforts is much more pronounced in this region than elsewhere. 
Finally, our analysis shows that technology upgrading is multidimensional construct and that 
aiming for aggregate composite indicator may actually mask the key issues which arise from 
different stages of technology upgrading in which countries find themselves and from their 
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specific paths of technology upgrading. CEE grew during 1990s/2008 based on production, not 
technological capability. Their future growth will increasingly depend on building technological 
capabilities at world frontier level.  Our analysis shows that the basis for such growth exists only 
to a limited extent and that speed of upgrading towards world frontier activities is well beyond 
required for catching up. Equally, our analysis shows that solutions for improved technology 
upgrading will need to be found with their existing innovation model of small open economies 
integrated into the EU. 
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